Why Share on Peer-to-Peer Networks?
(Download full paper)Filed under research category: Internet network economics
Tagged as: P2P public_goods incentive-centered_design
Authors
Lian Jian and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason
Publication date
August, 2008
Abstract
Prior theory and empirical work emphasize the enormous free-riding problem facing peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing networks. Nonetheless, many P2P networks thrive. We explore two possible explanations: private provision of public goods and generalized reciprocity. We investigate a particular form of private incentives to share content: redistributing traffic in the network to the advantage of the sharing peer. Our preliminary model suggests that this incentive is likely insufficient to motivate equilibrium content sharing in large networks. We then approach P2P networks as a graph-theoretic problem and derive sufficient conditions for sharing and free-riding to co-exist in the absence of direct sharing benefits or an explicit incentive mechanism.
Citation
Lian Jian and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason (2008), “Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks?”, International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC’08), Innsbruck, Austria, 19-22 August 20