Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason

Security When People Matter: Structuring Incentives for User Behavior (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. and Wash, Rick

Published on: January, 2007

Abstract: Humans are “smart components” in a system, but cannot be directly programmed to perform; rather, their autonomy must be respected as a design constraint and incentives provided to induce desired behavior. Sometimes these incentives are properly aligned, and the humans don’t represent a vulnerability. But often, a misalignment of incentives causes a weakness in the system that can be exploited by clever attackers. Incentive-centered design tools help us understand these problems, and provide design principles to alleviate them. We describe incentive-centered design and some tools it provides. We provide a number of examples of security problems for which Incentive Centered Design might be helpful. We elaborate with a general screening model that offers strong design principles for a class of security problems.

The Case for Market-based Push Caching (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. Chan, Yee Man Womer, Jonathan Jamin, Sugih

Published on: November, 1999

Variable QoS from Shared Web Caches: User-Centered Design and Value-Sensitive Replacement (Download full paper)

Terence P. Kelly, Sugih Jamin and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason

Published on: June, 1999

Abstract: Due to differences in server capacity, external bandwidth and client demand, some Web servers value cache hits more than others. Assuming that a shared cache knows the extent to which different servers value hits, it may employ a value-sensitive replacement policy in order to generate maximum aggregate value for servers. we consider both the prediction and value aspects of this problem and introduce a novel value-sensitive LFU/LRU hybrid which biases the allocation of cache space toward documents whose origin servers value caching most highly. We compare our algorithm with others from the Web caching literature and discuss from an economic standpoint the problems associated with obtaining servers' private valuation information.

Biased Replacement Policies for Web Caches: Differential Quality-of-Service and Aggregate User Value (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. Kelly, Terence P. Chan, Yee Man Jamin, Sugih

Published on: January, 1999

Abstract: Disk space in shared Web caches can be diverted to serve some system users at the expense of others. Cache hits reduce server loads, and if servers desire load reduction to different degrees, a replacement policy which prioritizes cache space across servers can provide differential quality-of-service (QoS). We present a simple generalization of least-frequently-used (LFU) replacement that is sensitive to varying levels of server valuation for cache hits. Through trace-driven simulation we show that under a particular assumption about server valuations our algorithm delivers a reasonable QoS relationship: higher byte hit rates for servers that value hits more. We furthermore adopt the economic perspective that value received by system users is a more appropriate performance metric than hit rate or byte hit rate, and demonstrate that our algorithm delivers higher "social welfare" (aggregate value to servers) than LRU or LFU.

Telephony, the Internet, and the Media (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. and David Waterman, eds.

Published on: January, 1998

Abstract: This review essay introduces the 15 selected papers from the 25th Annual TPRC. We mention major telecoms policy highlights of 1997, then offer a light interpretative essay with summaries of the papers. We organize the discussion into five general sections: "Historical," "Telephony," "The Internet," "The Media," and "Comparative Studies in Telephone and Satellite Policy." Readers will notice repeated themes and cross-connections between the chapters in these sections.

Network Architecture and Content Provision: An Economic Analysis (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., Scott Shenker and Hal Varian

Published on: January, 1996

Abstract: An earlier version of Service Architecture and Content Provision, as presented at the Telecom Policy Research Conference 1995. There are some additional mathematical examples, and a short section on the effects of architecture on content creation that we did not include in the published version.

Pricing Congestible Resources (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. and Hal Varian

Published on: September, 1995

Abstract: We describe the basic economic theory of pricing a congestible resource such as an ftp server, a router, a Web site, etc. In particular, we examine the implications of "congestion pricing" as a way to encourage efficient use of network resources. We explore the implications of flat pricing and congestion pricing for capacity expansion in centrally planned, competitive, and monopolistic environments

An AOL/Time Warner Merger Will Harm Competition in Internet Online Services (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.

Abstract: America Online (AOL) is the largest, and in some aspects dominant, firm in the aggregation and distribution of content and services over the Internet. AOL is also the largest provider of Internet access in the U.S. Overall, it is the most successful firm in the business of online services, or the joint provision of Internet access and content and service distribution. This is a business that AOL essentially invented, and no other firm has been able to compete effectively with AOL. Time-Warner (including its Road Runner subsidiary) is one of the most important present and future competitors in this business because it is the number two aggregator and distributor via high-speed (broadband) Internet connections, the next generation of Internet access. This merger thus combines AOL and one of its most significant competitors in online services, creating significant horizontal anti-competitive effects. The merger between AOL and Time Warner will horizontally and vertically increase AOL's power in the market for Internet online services. The anti-competitive effects of this merger will harm consumers.

One Size Doesn't Fit All: Improving Network QoS Through Preference-driven Web Caching (Download full paper)

Chan, Yee Man, Jonathan Womer, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Sugih Jamin

Abstract: In order to combat Internet congestion Web caches use replacement policies that attempt to keep the objects in a cache that are most likely to get requested in the future. We adopt the economic perspective that the objects with the greatest value to the users should be in a cache. Using trace driven simulations we implement an incentive compatible market-based Web cache for servers to push content into a cache. This system decentralizes the caching process as servers provide information in the form of bids for space in the cache. Truthful information from the server on valuations of objects and predictions of hit rates is obtained. This information is used in filling the cache, which can provide increased aggregate value and differential quality of service to servers when compared to LFU and LRU.

A Smart Market for Resource Reservation in a Multiple Quality of Service Information Network (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.

Abstract: The technology is nearly available to offer remarkably powerful new communications services: multiple streams, from multiple users, composed of different applications that require different qualities of service (QoS), all travelling over a single interconnected physical infrastructure. Society will benefit from integrated applications (video conferencing with interactive demos and shared whiteboards; computer-integrated telephony, etc.). However, we are a long way from from free, broadband, "anytime, anywhere" integrated services networks. Allocation of scarce resources in a multiple quality of service network may be the single greatest barrier to communications anytime, anywhere. In this paper I present a fairly general model of the problem, and, after showing that a decentralized open market will fail, I propose a "smart market" mechanism for solving the problem. The smart market implements simultaneously efficient routing and bandwidth allocation for reservations made in advance. As computing speed improves, the length of the advance reservation interval can be shortened.

A Market-Based Approach to Optimal Resource Allocation in Integrated-Services connection-Oriented Networks (Download full paper)

Panagiotis Thomas, Demosthenis Teneketzis and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason

Abstract: We present an approach to the admission control and resource allocation problem in connection-oriented networks that offer multiple services to users. Users' preferences are summarized by means of their utility functions, and each user is allowed to request more than one type of service. Multiple types of resources are allocated at each link along the path of a connection. We assume that the relation between Quality of Service (QoS) and resource allocation is given, and we incorporate it as a constraint into a static optimization problem. The objective of the optimization problem is to determine the amount and, required resources for each type of service to maximize the sum of the users' utilities. We prove the existence of a solution of the optimization problem, and describe a competitive market economy that implements the solution and satisfies the informational constraints imposed by the nature of the decentralized resource allocation problem. The economy consists of four different types of agents: resource providers, service providers, users, and an auctioneer that regulates the prices based on the observed aggregate excess demand. The goods that are sold are: (i) the resources at each link of the network; and (ii) services constructed from these resources and then delivered to users. We specify an iterative procedure that is used by the auctioneer to update the prices, and we show that it leads to an allocation that is arbitrarily close to a solution of the optimization problem in a finite number of iterations.

Feedback And Efficiency In ATM Networks (Download full paper)

Murphy, Liam, John Murphy, and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason

Abstract: Admission control and congestion control can provide performance guarantees in ATM networks. However some users may not be able to describe their traffic accurately enough for the network to provide these guarantees. By sending a dynamic feedback signal about the current utilization of network resources, the network could provide some guarantees to adaptive users who respond appropriately: this is the basis of ABR service. We outline a user-oriented framework for network operation and control, explicitly defining how such feedback is generated by the network and what form it takes. We show through simulations that it is possible to simultaneously gain both network and economic efficiency by using a form of feedback we call responsive pricing, which is compatible with current ATM Forum UNI specifications.

The Role of Responsive Pricing in the Internet (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., Liam Murphy and John Murphy

Abstract: The recent introduction of user-friendly navigation and retrieval tools for the World Wide Web has triggered an unprecedented level of interest in the Internet among the media and the general public, as well as in the technical community. It seems inevitable that some changes or additions are needed in the control mechanisms used to allocate usage of Internet resources. We argue that a feedback signal in the form of a variable price for network service is a workable tool to aid network operators in controlling Internet traffic. We suggest that these prices should vary dynamically based on the current utilization of network resources. We show how this responsive pricing puts control of network service back where it belongs: with the users.

Some Economics of the Internet (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. and Hal Varian

Abstract: This paper overlaps substantially with the paper Pricing the Internet. We describe the history, technology and costs of the Internet (at greater length than in "Pricing"). We describe a "smart market" for pricing Internet congestion. There is more attention to the smart market, and less to other pricing considerations, than in "Pricing."

Economic FAQs About the Internet (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. and Hal Varian

Abstract: We present some economic FAQs about the Internet in question-and-answer format. Updated, Summer 1995.

Pricing the Internet (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. and Hal Varian

Abstract: We describe the technology and costs of the Internet, then discuss how to design efficient pricing in order to allocate scarce Internet resources. We offer a "smart market" as a device to efficiently price congestion.

Some FAQs about Usage-Based Pricing (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. and Hal Varian

Abstract: Written for WWW '94 (Chicago). We answer some frequently asked questions about usage-sensitive pricing for Internet resources.