Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason

A Report on the PEAK Experiment: Context and Design (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. Bonn, Maria S. Lougee, Wendy P. Riveros, Juan F.

Published on: June, 1999

The PEAK Experiment: Usage and Economic Behavior (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. Riveros, Juan F. Bonn, Maria S. Lougee, Wendy P.

Published on: January, 1999

'Bundling' y el Acceso Electronico a la Informacion Academica: El Projecto PEAK (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. Riveros, Juan F.

Published on: December, 1998

PEAK: Pricing Electronic Access to Knowledge (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. Jankovich, Alexandra

Published on: January, 1997

Antitrust Immunity for Refusals to Deal in (Intellectual) Property Is a Slippery Slope (Download full paper)

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.

Abstract: The Federal Circuit's decision in CSU v. Xerox1 has generated enormous controversy. However, there seems to be emerging agreement among both critics and supporters of the decision on a correct, narrow reading of the decision. Whatever else the decision stands for, it appears to declare antitrust immunity for unilateral refusals to sell or license patented or copyrighted intellectual property (IP). What was at stake in Xerox is whether a firm with a legitimate property right in the design of certain parts has the right to condition sale of those parts with terms that enable Xerox to obtain a monopoly in a different market, for service labor. More broadly, what is at stake is a safe harbor for conduct that previously has been found illegal. For, although much emphasis is placed on whether this was a unilateral refusal to deal (as opposed to a concerted agreement, which would not be exempt from Section 1 scrutiny), it is at least as important that this was a conditional refusal. As I show below, the meaningful distinction between this conditional refusal to deal and a conventional illegal tie is nil. Further, if an antitrust exemption is given to all conditional unilateral refusals to deal, this formalistic shield will be easily available in the future to firms that would otherwise be subject to antitrust liability for tying or other concerted agreements.